Moeed Yusuf (Ed.), *Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Challenge* (George Town University Press, 2014), 272.

The book “Pakistan’s counter-terrorism challenge” is an edited volume by Moeed Yusuf, which provides a comprehensive insight into Pakistan’s counter-terrorism (CT) challenges. Moeed Yusuf has brought together some prominent practitioners, academicians and analysts to assess, identify and address the counter-terrorism challenges to the state of Pakistan.

In the introductory chapter Moeed Yusuf argues that the Taliban’s activities in Afghanistan and Islamic radical movements elsewhere impact the morale and resource availability to militant groups in Pakistan. However, this assertion is not universally true. For example, if an Afghan Shia militia is gaining strength and popular support it will not favour Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan or a Takfiri militant outfit. The domino effect primarily depends on factors such as common ideology and strategic ambitions. This chapter does not discuss the important factors, which impact the non-state actors’ activities in the state. In chapter 1 Moeed Yusuf mainly argues that Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities remain in a race against time to pacify Islamist militancy engaged in generating violent opposition to the state. The state is unlikely to succeed unless the military expands its operational capacity and the government addresses many institutional weaknesses that constrain a coherent anti-terrorism policy and Pakistan’s regional security environment. However, Pakistan has overcome many of the difficulties in implementing its anti-terrorist policies since the book was published.

In chapter 2 Marvin G. Weinbaum argues that Pakistan is the epicentre of international terrorism. It hosts organizations that
Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Challenge

challenge the political stability of Pakistan, its regions, and also directly threaten Western interests. The author links Pakistan to terrorist attacks in India. He further argues that the activities of militant organizations constrain Pakistan’s capacity to be an active ally in counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. However, every state in the arena of international politics somehow aspires to engage with the militant outfits to serve their national interests. For example, during Afghan Jihad the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported the Afghan Taliban to defeat Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. India supported Mukti Bahini terrorists to disintegrate East Pakistan, and history is full of such examples. For these reasons, this chapter doesn’t make the arguments in a credible fashion.

Chapter 3 gives an overview of military operations conducted by the state of Pakistan. In this chapter, Ejaz Haider argues that enhancing counter-terrorism capability of police force deployed in the main urban centers is needed to succeed in this war. Such operations require a different set of priorities and measures that Pakistan has largely failed to take in the last decade. In chapter 4 Hussain and Malik have attempted to explain the political instability and its implications for framing and implementing effective and formal rule changes. It would entail frequent amendments to the constitution and the rules of business. They argue that it is highly factionalized nature of Pakistani politics and society that prevents consensus on policy issues that in turn becomes a hurdle in exercising effective control over non-state actors by the state.

In chapter 5 Sohail Habib Tajik discusses the role of civilian intelligence and law enforcement agencies in countering extremism. He highlights problems faced by the police force in dealing with threats for which they were not trained or equipped to deal. The main theme of this chapter revolves around the non-availability of appropriate technology, and lack of capacity of the
police, which is leading to weak responses in CT efforts. In chapter 6 Ahmer Bilal Sufi discusses the legal aspect of the CT domain. He identifies legal shortcomings in the country’s counter-terrorism drive. Sufi mainly suggests that the government of Pakistan should issue a clear mission statement about the military operations against the threat of terrorism. In his view, Pakistanis perceive that Pakistan is fighting America’s proxy war and the government of Pakistan need to dispel this perception. Actually, this assertion is not completely true. Majority of people in Pakistan had supported the role of military operations and armed forces to eradicate the menace of terrorism and insurgency. Sufi exaggerates when he says, “The people of Pakistan deserve to know facts, figures, and political or religious arguments that legitimize military operations as a last resort to secure civilian power and domestic stability”. Much had already been made public about the military operations since the book was published.

In chapter 7 Muhammad Amir Rana discusses the militant methods to attract and generate financial resources. However, Rana overstates when he argues that Jihadi print media has emerged as an alternative print media in Pakistan over the last two decades. It is a common observation that Jihadi magazines often are sold or distributed outside mosques, madrassas, but at a few public places. Their availability is therefore limited. They are unlikely to achieve a wide target audience among the common citizens. It is even less likely that militant finances mainly depend through the sale of their publications.

In chapter 8, Zafarullah Khan discusses the growing use of cyber space and technology by the militant outfits. He explains that the militants use this technology to propagate their ideology. He then discusses in detail the specific tools and techniques that terrorists use to pursue their goals. He further highlights that the existing institutions that monitor the terrorists’ cyber activities in Pakistan such as Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), the Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), and the Cyber Crimes Wing of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) are very weak.

In the last chapter, Anatol Lieven has discussed the severity of the threat to the state of Pakistan and questions whether it will survive the challenges of terrorism and insurgency. He argues that Pakistan is facing a basic dilemma by doing what the United States wants, and at the same time stirs up unrest among its population and more importantly among its soldiers. This assertion is not true. The people of Pakistan fully support the military operations and stand by their armed forces. There is no conflict in soldiers over the military operations. The concluding chapter highlights some observations from the discussion in the earlier chapters and also suggests some policy measures to deal with the growing threat of Terrorism/Insurgency.

This book is an introductory level study about Pakistan’s counter-terrorism challenge. For anyone who is interested in learning about counter-terrorism challenges to the state of Pakistan, this book is useful as it covers different aspects of CT in a single volume. However, some arguments need more discussion. I recommend this book along with Dr. Khurram Iqbal’s The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs for graduate students of international relations and strategic studies. But, there is still a need to critically analyse the precepts discussed in the book.

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